We have everything to fear from ID cards

Among the basic civil rights in this country, there has always been, at least in theory, an inclination towards liberal democracy, which includes a tolerance of an individual's right to privacy.

We are born free and have the right to decide what freedom means, each for ourselves, and to have control over our outward existence, yet that will no longer be the case if we agree to identity cards.

Britain is already the most self-watching country in the world, with the largest network of security cameras; a new study suggests we are now every bit as poor at protecting privacy as Russia, China and America.

But surveillance cameras and lost data will prove minuscule problems next to ID cards, which will obliterate the fundamental right to walk around in society as an unknown.

Some of you may have taken that freedom so much for granted that you forget how basic and important it is, but in every country where ID cards have ever been introduced, they have changed the relation between the individual and the state in a way that has not proved beneficial to the individual. I am not just talking Nazi Germany, but everywhere.

It is also a spiritual matter: a person's identity is for him or her to decide and to control, and if someone decides to invest the details of their person in a higher authority, then it should not be the Home Office.

The compulsory ID card scheme is a sickness born of too much suspicion and too little regard for the meaning of tolerance and privacy in modern life.

Hooking individuals up to a system of instantly accessible data is an obscenity - not only a system waiting to be abused, but a system already abusing.

Though we don't pay much attention to moral philosophy in the mass media now - Bertrand Russell having long been exchanged for the Jeremy Kyle Show - it may be worth remembering that Britain has a tradition of excellence when it comes to distinguishing and upholding basic rights and laws in the face of excessive power.

The ID cards issue should be raising the most stimulating arguments about who we are and how we are - but no, it is not: we nose the grass like sheep and prepare to be herded once again.

It seems the only person speaking up with a broad sense of what this all means is Nick Clegg, the new leader of the Liberal Democrats, who has devoted much of his new year message to underlining the sheer horribleness of the scheme.

He has said he will go to jail rather than bow to this "expensive, invasive and unnecessary" affront to "our natural liberal tendencies".

I have to say I cheered when I heard this, not only because I agree, but because it is entirely salutary, in these sheepish times, to see a British politician express his personal feelings so strongly.

Many people on the other side of the argument make what might be called a category mistake when they say: "If you've nothing to hide, why object to carrying a card?"

Making it compulsory to prove oneself, in advance, not to be a threat to society is an insult to one's right not to be pre-judged or vetted.

Our system of justice is based on evidence, not on prior selection, and the onus on proving criminality is a matter for the justice system, where proof is of the essence.

Many regrettable things occur as a result of freedom - some teenage girls get pregnant, some businessmen steal from their shareholders, some soldiers torture their enemies, some priests exploit children - but these cases would not, in a liberal society, require us to end the private existence of all people just in case.

If the existence of terrorists, these few desperate extremists, makes it necessary for everybody in Britain to carry an ID card then it is a price too high.

It is more than a price, it is a defeat, and one that we will repent at our leisure. Challenges to security should, in fact, make us more protective of our basic freedoms; it should, indeed, make us warm to our rights.

In another age, it was thought sensible to try to understand the hatred in the eyes of our enemies, but now it seems we consider it wiser just to devalue the nature of our citizenship.

What's more - it won't work. Nick Clegg has pointed to the gigantic cost and fantastic hubris involved in this scheme, but recent gaffes with personal information have shown just how difficult it is to control and protect data.

A poll of doctors undertaken by doctors.net.uk has today shown that a majority of doctors believe that the National Programme for IT - seeking to contain all the country's medical records - will not be secure.

In fact, it is causing great worry. Many medical professionals fear that detailed information about each of us will soon be whizzing haphazardly from one place to another, leaving patients at the mercy of the negligent, the nosy, the opportunistic and the exploitative.

"Only people with something to hide will fear the introduction of compulsory ID cards."

That is what they say, and it sounds perfectly practical. If you think about it for a minute, though, it begins to sound less than practical and more like an affront to the reasonable (and traditional) notion that the state should mind its own business.

In a just society, what you have to hide is your business, until such times as your actions make it the business of others. Infringing people's rights is not an ethical form of defence against imaginary insult.

You shouldn't have to tell the government your eye colour if you don't want to, never mind your maiden name, your height, your personal persuasions in this or that direction, all to be printed up on a laminated card under some compulsory picture, to say you're one of us.

You weren't born to be one of us, that is something you choose, and to take the choice out of it is wrong. It marks the end of privacy, the end of civic volition, the end of true citizenship.

And not just in the UK, no no no no. The U.S.A. , Canada and so on and so forth :

Lib Dems' Nick Clegg targets ID cards

Nick Clegg promised Liberal Democrats a "momentous" first year under his leadership - and said 2008 is the year to "bring down" plans for ID cards.

In a New Year message he urged the party to take an "unparalleled opportunity" to win over millions more voters, setting May's local elections as an early test. Clegg: eyeing opportunities Mr Clegg, who narrowly beat Chris Huhne in the race to succeed Sir Menzies Campbell earlier this month, is the third man in as many years to head the party. But he said he was the one to break the two-party stranglehold by tapping into Britain's liberal tendencies and putting people "in control of their destinies". "We have before us an unparalleled opportunity. We must reach beyond the stale two-party system to the millions of people who share our liberal values and change Britain for the better," Mr Clegg said. In a direct attack on David Cameron's Tories, who have deliberately tried to woo Lib Dem supporters, he said they wanted to "block opportunity not promote it". Mr Clegg, who has said he is willing to be jailed rather than accept an ID card, concluded: "The child benefit and learner drivers' data loss scandals mean there is a looming crisis of public confidence in the Government's capacity to look after their personal information. "So let 2008 be the year we bring down the identity cards scheme."

Beware the state’s ID card sharks

David Davis

If Gordon Brown picks one failure from his first six months to learn from, it should be the loss of 25m people’s personal details. If he makes one resolution for 2008, it should be to scrap his reckless plan to introduce compulsory ID cards.

“Discgate” was the result of ministerial incompetence, but also flawed policy. As chancellor, Brown relentlessly pursued his forlorn vision of a “joined-up identity management regime” across public services. As prime minister, he continues this vain search, like an obsessed alchemist, for a giant database that his closest advisers ominously refer to as a “single source of truth”.

This fixation has not revolutionised public services. It has led to disaster. Brown’s approach combines three flaws: the ruthless pursuit of “identity management”; a naive faith in computerised solutions; and sheer recklessness in managing the integrity of systems to which he is devoted. This has delivered a massively overcentralised government and a surveillance society.

The government’s track record with IT and database projects is woeful. Take the Home Office. The criminal records bureau wrongly labelled 2,700 innocent people as having criminal records. The sex offenders’ register lost more than 300 serious criminals. And the convictions of 27,000 criminals – including murderers, rapists and paedophiles – were left off the police national computer. Finally, the DNA database combines the worst of all worlds: 100,000 innocent children who should never have been on it, 26,000 police-collected samples left off it and half a million entries misrecorded.

When HM Revenue and Customs lost 25m records, it was the latest of 2,110 security breaches in the past year. It ignored direct advice not to send sensitive data unprotected. The wider consequences remain to be seen. The review into the fiasco has already revealed that an American firm contracted by the Department for Transport has lost – in Iowa – personal details of 3m applicants for driving licences. It is, at least, now clear that the reality of data-sharing across government is a far cry from the “great prize of the information age” that Brown was boasting about in October.

A government that refuses to learn from past failures is destined to repeat them. But Brown continues his mission to find the IT panacea of public sector reform. And nothing can be allowed to detract from his quest to find the ultimate elixir – a national identity register coupled with compulsory ID cards.

The prime minister ignores categorical advice from experts. Microsoft’s UK technology officer warns that ID cards risk the “honeypot” effect of clustering masses of personal data in one place, presenting what one chief constable called the “gold standard” target for criminal hackers. Biometric passports can be cloned with a gadget costing £100 and the market in stolen identities is flourishing – a BBC investigation found forged documents being sold online to underage drinkers for £10.

If the government gives away your bank account details, it is a disaster, but at least you can change your bank account. What do you do if the government gives away your fingerprints?

Any countervailing security dividend, from the billions of pounds wasted, is negligible at best. Ministers have openly conceded that ID cards will do little to prevent terrorism or crime. The Home Office website lists, as popular myth, that “ID cards can stop global terrorism and crime”. Yet Brown continues to pretend to parliament that “an identity scheme will help prevent people already in the country from using multiple identities for terrorist, criminal or other purposes”.

Far from heeding Conservative calls to scrap the central ID database and focus on improving biometric technology and safeguards, the government is expanding its horizons further. It signed the Prüm treaty, which involves sharing fingerprints, DNA and car registration details across Europe. If the government cannot protect the personal information it passes round Whitehall or Iowa, how will it protect such data when they reach Warsaw?

Indeed the government is not a reluctant player in this European Union agenda. It is the pioneer, piloting Project Stork, the codename for a scheme to make all EU electronic identity networks “interoperable” within three years. It does not augur well that the home secretary had not even heard of Project Stork when questioned in parliament last month.

Instead of treating our personal details and private life as though they were the property of the state, it is about time ministers understood that this information is held on trust. We need serious restrictions on the transfer and sharing of such information. The current casual and careless practice is intolerable.

A Conservative government would not ignore the opportunities that technology presents for the public sector. But neither will we be blind to the risks in setting up mammoth databases with all their inherent frailties. A Conservative government will channel all its efforts into protecting its citizens, including their personal details. Information technology can help, but there is no substitute for careful, conscientious scrutiny by people with expertise and experience.

The prime minister’s lesson from 2007 should be that government cannot be run robotically – it needs a human touch. So his first resolution for 2008 should be to ditch ID cards, to avoid history repeating itself.

David Davis is the shadow home secretary

• Have your say

Wow! A real piece of journalism in a mainstream paper...
Oh, it's the shadow home sec. not a journalist, my bad ;)

Go back to sleep people, nothing to see here.

Andy, Newcastle, UK

Well said. Of course this whole totalitarian obsession is driven by Brussels. When something is so obviously wrong, on any number of grounds, and the proponents continue to insist that it is a good thing no matter what the evidence, you have to ask why? Why do otherwise reasonably sensible people just keep on with ever more pathetic attempt to justify it? Why are the gullible constantly encouraged to repeat the mantra "if you have done nothing wrong you have nothing to hide"? Plainly there is something unspoken, and unspeakable, behind it. You need not look far to see what or where that something is. Face the EU and open your eyes.

D.L. Stephens, York, England

What is worrying is that we already have 'EU' identity documents in the form of passports and driving licences.

The EU wants electronic ID cards for all on the pretext we can access government services anywhere, and is pushing for a massive network of databases with our health data. How can we be sure that the Conservatives will stand up to the EU with its own megalomaniac ambitions of statehood?

by, Winston Smith, Harpenden, Herts

House-to-house registration and ID cards Convenience, competence and cost By Hugh Cholmondeley Sunday, December 30th 2007

There has been little public debate about the standards for assessing the method chosen for house-to-house registration and almost no discussion about the full costs of this exercise. At the same time, there has been little deliberation about President Jagdeo's suggestion for a "multi-purpose" identification card. No matter; the public has now been informed about arrangements for visits to their homes by registration officers that signal commencement of preparations for the new National Register of Registrants. One key test for success will be the extent to which home visits are convenient for citizens who are employed; others who work in outlying areas; and still others who are parents of children attending school and taking private lessons. During house visits persons will be asked to show documents that confirm their age. GECOM has announced that these documents must include one or more of the following: an original birth certificate; an original marriage certificate; an original deed poll as well as original birth certificate or a valid passport in the case of a name change by deed poll; or an original naturalisation certificate. Once satisfied that documents are in order, registration officers will ask questions of each applicant for registration, legibly insert the answers into a form, take a photograph and obtain all ten fingerprints of each applicant. The completed form would then be signed by the applicant and submitted by the registration officer to GECOM headquarters for processing and eventual delivery of a new national identification card to each successful applicant. The challenge The house-to-house registration exercise was preceded by an important agreement between the government, parliamentary political parties and GECOM. This agreement was signed on June 14, 2007 and witnessed by the key external donors. Since then, concerns have been raised about the availability of adequate numbers of skilled personnel to collect information; convenient times for family members; possibilities for mischief; the likelihood of multiple registration; the transparency of the process and the role of scrutineers representing political parties. While full details about the exact costs of this exercise are still to be made public, its scope and scale are awesome. It is estimated that there are about 600,000 citizens of Guyana above the age of 14 years. This would mean that say, a minimum of 3,000 literate, skilled and competent registration officers must be recruited and trained. They would need to visit at least 120,000 homes during the six-month period between January and July 2008. These officers must be trained so that all are capable of legibly transcribing information onto some 600,000 application forms. They must all be competent to take 600,000 photographs and obtain 6,000,000 fingerprints in a professional way that ensures that the quality of data and information they have collected can be correctly encoded in a database capable of withstanding scrutiny by all political parties, special-interest groups, civil society organisations and, of course, citizens themselves. Another way In general, countries choose one of two systems to carry out registration exercises. First, the state-initiated system. This method is used by only a few countries, Guyana included, where registration officers visit the homes of all citizens. Second, the self-initiated system. Most countries use this method where the citizen takes the initiative to visit a registration centre so that he or she can be enumerated. In Guyana's case, consideration could have been given to a simpler and less costly method in which responsibility for registration is shared by the state and the citizens. GECOM could have set up registration centres in every community within walking distance of every citizen's home, just as polling places are established for elections. Instead of six months, the registration period could be limited to say, six weeks, with citizens deciding the most convenient time to visit centres that would be open only on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays. Mobile centres could be set up to register citizens who live in hinterland communities. More specifically, this method could include, * consideration of a small financial incentive to encourage citizens to register as well as publicising the consequences of attempting to register more than once; * establishing say, 1,000 registration centres in all communities with each centre located within walking distance of no more than, say, 600 citizens; * providing each centre with trained and competent technical staff, electrical power, security and sanitation facilities for citizens, officials and scrutineers; * providing each centre with a laptop computer, kit and software that enable entry of basic information, photographs and machine-readable fingerprints; * establishing an adequate number of mobile centres to enable visits to hinterland communities in difficult geographic locations; and, * arranging for the eventual distribution of ID cards through visits by citizens to the same centre originally assigned for undertaking registration. Multi-purpose ID cards and civil registers President Jagdeo's suggestion of a "multiple-purpose" ID card raises an important related issue and it might be helpful to look at some experiences of countries which have instituted such a card. Better yet, it might even be more useful to examine some possible consequences for a citizen of such a country who did not possess a multi purpose card. That citizen might be: * unable to work in either the formal or informal economy; * unable to collect pension, disability or other payments provided by the state; * unable to cash cheques at banks, insurance companies or other financial institutions; * unable to receive a driver's licence or other authorization provided by the state; * unable to record the birth of a child or the death of a relative; * unable to register in an educational institution or enrol a child in school; * unable to register either a marriage or a divorce; * unable to lease, purchase or sell property because of the absence of tax clearance; and, * unable to exercise the right to vote in local or national elections. Taken to its logical conclusion, the President's suggestion raises the question as to whether the time is right for Guyana to establish a civil register. Many governments have opted to establish civil registers in order to better manage the economy, administer and deliver social and other services and promote development. The introduction of a civil register is usually accompanied by the issuance of a multi-purpose ID card that contains among other information a person's legal name, date of birth, gender, address, signature, card number, card expiration date, health insurance number and other basic information. On the one hand, the benefits of a civil register include more efficient ways of maintaining population data; evaluating the impact of government services; keeping tax records and using the same basic data to establish a list of voters at elections from time to time. On the other hand, citizens in many countries raise questions about their government having access to personal details and possible misuse of this information. Just a few days ago the new Australian Labour government threw out the "access card," a proposal by the previous government that would have required citizens to present a multi-purpose ID card any time they dealt with certain government departments. Notwithstanding these reservations, should a decision be taken to implement the President's suggestion, several government agencies would be confronted with a challenge that has three basic objectives. First, to use technology to establish databases containing personal information about citizens. Second, to establish protocols and procedures that guarantee the confidentiality of such information. And third, to ensure that information about citizens is used solely for purposes of security and efficient delivery of services. It is well known in Guyana that several government agencies such as the Revenue Authority and the National Insurance Scheme are currently compiling data bases of information about citizens so that a range of social and other services might be more efficiently delivered to citizens. The issue then is whether GECOM's house-to-house registration exercise should be an important contribution to the work of establishing a civil register for Guyana. If a decision is taken to establish such a national civil register, it stands to reason that implementation of GECOM's house-to-house registration exercise should be a part of this process and await a collaborative agreement between all government agencies currently establishing data-bases of citizens. Such an agreement should put in place an institutional and organisational infrastructure to design an integrated approach for gathering data and maintaining the register. Such collaboration could include a pilot exercise in representative localities so that costs could be ascertained and methodologies tested. GECOM, as the agency mandated to establish and maintain a permanent register of all citizens above the age of 14 years is obviously the agency that should take the lead in such a national effort. A comprehensive, well thought-out approach to the important task of registration is urgently needed. It should be undertaken in the context of President Jagdeo's suggestion for a multi-purpose ID card since this logically requires a detailed examination of the usefulness of a national civil register for Guyana.