Russian expert claims Iran cannot make Nukes for 10 Years.

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Iran Incapable of Building Nuclear Bomb — Russian Expert

Created: 01.02.2006 19:44 MSK

Mos

Iran is not capable of building its own nuclear weapons, the former head of a nuclear power plant and current regional leader in southern Russia said Wednesday.

“In reality, the U.S. is provoking Iran, accusing it of aiming, along with the implementation of its peaceful nuclear programs, to create its own nuclear weapons,” Governor of the Saratov Region Pavel Ipatov was quoted by RIA Novosti as saying.

Ipatov, who was head the Balakovo power plant for almost 20 years, said that currently, in view of the methods in place for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
“Iran is in no state to create a nuclear bomb secretly.”

The United States, along with the trio of European negotiating with Iran (Great Britain, France and Germany), are employing “double standards” in accusing Iran of attempting to create nuclear weapons, and this greatly complicates the situation the country, he said.

If Iran’s nuclear file is referred to the UN Security Council, Russia and China, both veto-wielding permanent members, could block resolutions on Iran, the governor said.

Ipatov also said that although Iran had adopted an “unconstructive position,” he hoped Russia and China would be able to reach an agreement with the country on creating a peaceful joint project to enrich uranium for Iran on Russia’s territory.

Other people feel that Iran is capable of making them, yet the movtive is not near as deadly as the neo-con war machine would have us believe. Awesome article posted by Robert E. Hunter, a senior advisor at the Rand Corp., has held many senior government appointments, including serving as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998 and Director of Middle East Affairs at the National Security Council from 1979 to 1981. LINK HERE . Robert E. Hunter stated in this article that the main reason [ and this is for most countries, well all except the US which has used it in agression on Japan ], nukes are for deterrence. Here is the part titled "

What Happens if Iran Gets the Bomb?

What will happen if Iran gets “the bomb”? In contemplating this possibility, some analysts throw up their hands in horror, others are relatively calm about the results, and still others deny the possibility of such an outcome. Nevertheless, any realistic U.S. policy must consider such a scenario.

One frequently expressed concern is that Iran would consider its nuclear weapons capability to be held in trust for the Islamic world or would give custody of a weapon to someone else, perhaps even a terrorist group. Such an outcome is theoretically possible, but not very probable. With one notable and quickly regretted exception—Soviet transfer of some U-235 to China in the 1950s—no country with bomb-making fissionable materials has knowingly transferred them to anyone else.

More useful to consider is the role that nuclear weapons would play in shaping post-nuclear Iran’s relationships with its neighbors—friends and foes. When all is said and done, such weapons would have little military utility except for deterrence. This would operate at four levels: to deter a conventional attack from a non-nuclear regional power; to deter an openly nuclear regional state—today only including Pakistan and India; to deter Israel; or to deter a major external power, notably the United States but, in theory at least, also including Russia.

The first case is obvious: no country with just conventional arms is likely to try the patience of a nuclear power. But in the other three cases, “proportional deterrence” would come into play. Originally developed by France, this doctrine holds that a relatively less-capable nuclear power such as Iran can deter a much stronger nuclear power (the United States, Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel) if it is viewed as able and willing to destroy “value targets” in the attacking nation even while it is being obliterated. This complex doctrine can be summarized as the “death throes” of a country under nuclear or even extreme conventional attack.

Such a doctrine depends on the potential attacker such as the United States or Israel calculating that the targets in its own country that would be destroyed in retaliation would be more “valuable” to it than the benefit (military or political) of annihilating Iran. Of course, proportional deterrence can only succeed if the potential retaliation is credible, hence the need for a survivable second-strike capability. The threat of retaliation must not be so precise that the original attacking nation can calculate with precision whether the game is worth the candle (uncertainty principle). There should also be a margin for the leadership of the attacked nation to over-respond (irrationality principle). All these ideas were worked out in detail during the Cold War.

By the same token, of course, Iran would also be subject to deterrence, as it is today by Israel, in particular. Indeed, recent commentary about Iranian advances in missile technology may not be related to a future nuclear arsenal. They are more likely to be an attempt to gain the ability to launch relatively accurate conventional warheads at Israel, counting on that capability to have some proportional deterrent effect on Israel if, for example, that country was inclined to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities like that on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981.

These calculations can be elaborated further. What they add up to is an Iran with one or more nuclear weapons that would not, per se, have a destabilizing effect on security in the region. That would be very much “scenario dependent.” Nevertheless, as with all issues involving nuclear weapons, psychology and politics are critical elements. Indeed, if they were not—if the world had not witnessed Hiroshima and Nagasaki—we would likely have seen much more proliferation over the past 60 years, as many analysts long predicted, or even the further use of nuclear weapons in war.

As things now stand in the Middle East and are likely to stand for the foreseeable future, a nuclear-armed Iran would change the politics and the security of the region dramatically in terms of perceptions. The point need hardly be spelled out. Further, even if regional and outside countries could in time adjust to a nuclear-armed Iran, judged from today, it is highly unlikely that Iran would be permitted to gain such a capability. The United States, Israel, or perhaps some third-party would likely use whatever means necessary to prevent Iran from ever getting into that position.

In the past Iran was thought of in much higher respect then Iraq , IE from 1995-1998 the Atomic Scientists put out this report about Iran not being like Iraq. Ok that was years ago, how say in the last few years has Iran changed ?.... They stated they would pursue Nuclear power for the people. And with this, the next step could be weapons. By why then is Isreal allowed and the USA and Pakistan allowed weapons and not Iran? Is it democracy only club ? They may not like Americans and vice versa sometimes, or sure Isreal and Iran trade talks, but a weapon on each side makes less the threat of total war then one weapon on one side I say. Irans foreign minister wrote this :

Iran’s nuclear option
Kamal Kharrazi

LINK

Iran has every right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy agenda, insists Kamal Kharrazi. America’s double standards have increased mistrust around the world

Extremism doesn’t only breed terrorism. It also chips away at the solidarity of nations united against terrorism, undermines the rule of international law and creates chaos in international relations.

Recent years have been tragically marked by extremism in its various forms. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and other subsequent acts have claimed thousands of lives. However, the US administration’s response to those attacks, as well as its counterproductive approach to world affairs – which has only increased uncertainty and instability in the world – could also be described as extremist.

The same can be said of America’s approach to Iran’s peaceful energy programme – a stance which runs explicitly against efforts made by my government, together with the European Union (EU), to build confidence in it.

An extremist and unilateralist approach is at work in Washington’s view to undermine recent constructive efforts to resolve the misunderstanding over Iran’s nuclear programme. Washington does not view Iran’s nuclear file objectively or on its own merits. By insisting on referring the Iranian case to the Security Council and dismissing the valuable efforts undertaken by the Europeans, the US government is instead trying to settle its own scores with Iran.

This approach persists, despite the latest developments that demonstrate Iran’s readiness to go to extra lengths to prove that its nuclear programme is peaceful and to do whatever it takes to build confidence with the entire world in this respect.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) board of governors in its last resolution “welcomes the fact that Iran has decided to continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities”. At the same time, it recognizes that the suspension “is a voluntary confidence-building measure, not a legal obligation”.

Demonstration of goodwill
The agreement we reached with Britain, France and Germany and other EU countries on November 14, 2004, paved the way for the reasonable outcome at the end of the board’s deliberations on Iran’s nuclear energy programme. Despite the difficulties and misgivings on the domestic scene, we reached an agreement that demonstrated our goodwill, in the hope that it would be reciprocated and allow us to continue down the path of further confidence-building.

These two developments came on the heels of the latest IAEA report in mid-November, which confirmed that inspectors had uncovered no evidence of concealed nuclear activities or an atomic weapons programme in Iran. The report specifies that “all the declared material in Iran has been accounted for and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities”. The new developments, along with the other measures we adopted in the past two years, demonstrate Iran’s full commitment to the non-proliferation treaties, particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to strengthen the NPT safeguards regime. This is the course we are prepared to continue pursuing. At the same time, we are unwavering in our refusal to succumb to those who may wish to deprive us of our inalienable rights under the NPT.

The Iranian approach
The following considerations lie at the heart of the Iranian approach to its nuclear energy programme.
First, Iran must diversify its energy resources in order to ensure its sustainable development, as well as the livelihood of its present and future generations. We therefore decided to develop nuclear energy – as early as the beginning of the 1970s. In fact, by the eve of the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian nuclear energy programme was well advanced, having benefited from the active assistance of a number of European countries, and a favourable and encouraging stance by the United States.

All Iranian governments in recent history – both royal and Islamic – have sought nuclear energy, not out of political affiliation, but rather because of a strong economic rationale for diversifying the country’s energy mix. Iran’s desire to become economically self-sufficient and to be able to redistribute its wealth while doing away with overdependency on oil export revenues is a sentiment widespread throughout Iranian polity and society.

The country’s population, currently around 70 million, has doubled since 1979, and is projected to hit 105 million by 2050. And with a territory of 1.6 million square kilometres, we have no choice other than gaining access to a more diversified and secure source of energy.

Iran’s economy is growing at around 7%. It consumes half its crude oil production inside the country, and needs an additional 2,000 megawatts of electricity per year.

It would be profoundly negligent of any government to shun the needs of future generations and jeopardize their wellbeing by not taking action now. Oil and gas are finite resources that will be depleted in a few decades at the current rates of consumption, unless we find alternative sources of energy – and foreign currency. If Iran continues on its current trajectory, we may end up being a net importer of energy in about 20 years. So we cannot sit back and not prepare ourselves for such eventualities.

Aside from the economic and environmental justifications for Iran’s quest for nuclear energy, it is a matter of principle that a mid-sized emerging economy such as Iran’s cannot and should not deprive itself of the powerful momentum that nuclear technology would provide. The national consensus on this issue is based on the fact that all economic sectors would thrive upon achieving nuclear-grade standard, across all industries.

A legitimate right
Second, given that Iran is technologically and materially capable, legally entitled and politically – in terms of public opinion – mandated to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy programme, how could any Iranian government give it up? Since we possess all the necessary components of such a programme, including uranium mines, technical know-how, human resources and equipment, every Iranian asks why we should therefore deprive ourselves of it.

The international mechanisms governing nuclear programmes provide for rights and obligations. While Iranians abide by their obligations, they expect, at the same time, to be able to enjoy their rights. No-one is entitled to seek arbitrarily to deprive a sovereign state of its legitimate rights.

Third, Iran is legally bound to forgo the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is also in its interest, as the largest and the most populous country in the region, to discourage an arms race in the region. Moreover, given the prevailing international climate, developing nuclear weapons would be a liability, not an advantage. Going nuclear will not enhance Iran’s security, and on this understanding we signed the NPT in 1968 and proposed, in 1974, to declare the Middle East a nuclear weapons-free zone.

Iran’s commitment to its NPT obligations stems not only from its contractual obligation and security considerations, but also from its religious and ethical considerations. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has reiterated on several occasions a fatwa prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. He repeated this fatwa in an address on November 5, 2004. Given the importance of the fatwa institution in Shia Islam, the broad significance of this should not be underestimated. Fourth, Iran’s efforts to strengthen the safeguard regime so far have included the signing of the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003 and its immediate implementation; the voluntary suspension of the enrichment and reprocessing activities; active cooperation with the IAEA in providing information, making people available for interviews and granting the agency access to and permission for environmental sampling at all locations in respect of which the agency had made requests; agreeing on February 24, 2004 to suspend voluntarily the manufacture, assembly and testing of centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components; and, finally, suspension of all tests and production of uranium conversion facility, as well as suspending the manufacture of components, and assembly and testing of centrifuge, on November 14, 2004.

Failures blown out of proportion
On some occasions in the past several years, the IAEA has highlighted certain failures on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and has then asked that officials take corrective measures. Yet in the politically charged environment created by American and Israeli officials alike, cases that would typically be considered routine elsewhere were blown out of proportion and led to irresponsible speculation.

True, over the past 18 years Iran has not always provided the agency with all the information it has demanded. But this should be viewed against the backdrop of illegal restrictions, including the United States’ extraterritorially imposed sanctions. Moreover, hardly any member-state can claim to be flawless, as any cursory review of the IAEA’s Safeguard Implementation Reports will show. Negligence or failure on the part of NPT signatories is routine.

It is also important to recall that the IAEA report from November 2003 had confirmed that “to date there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities… were related to a nuclear weapons programme”.

Fifth, the only way to counter the challenges related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to strengthen the relevant international instruments through multilateral, comprehensive and non-discriminatory efforts. The NPT is the cornerstone of international efforts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament; to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of this deplorable weapon.

However, it is worrying to note shortcomings and a number of setbacks, particularly since 2000, such as the United States’ intention to develop and stockpile a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons for use in conventional conflicts and against non-nuclear adversaries; America’s reliance on nuclear weaponry for the foreseeable future; and the notion of pre-emptive strike, developed as a part of the US national security strategy.

While the NPT constitutes an integrated structure, its effectiveness lies in full compliance with all its provisions by all parties. The selective approach by a few states to the provisions of the NPT undermines international interest in its full implementation. The refusal of certain states to address the issue of nuclear disarmament, as referred to in the NPT, is the treaty’s key provision which remains unaddressed and unimplemented. Selective and discriminatory approaches towards the implementation of the NPT will impair its credibility and thereby its effectiveness to address the challenges at hand.

America’s extremist approach towards Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, as well as towards non-proliferation issues in general – including double standards, such as its tacit acceptance of Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons programme – has increased mistrust among countries not only within the Muslim world but in the entire world. We must take corresponding and appropriate measures to allay such mutual suspicion. But, given the depth of the mistrust, drastic action is required. Otherwise, the gulf between the moderate mainstream in both the Islamic world and the west could widen, and the bleak notion of a clash of civilizations might prevail.

Kamal Kharrazi
Kamal Kharrazi is Iran’s foreign minister.

All I can say is if they and I know they can stop Iran without war, the UN and the USA goto war, it is only to take control of the main 3 reigons for movement of Oil and supplies and power.

Peace out.